Wednesday, February 25, 2009

prime ministers of canada

Prime Ministers of Canada Gallery

Canada's Prime Ministers bring a variety of life experiences to the job. This unique collection highlights the political and electoral histories of our Prime Ministers and includes biographical details. When available, a bibliography of selected publications for each Prime Minister is included.


Picture of Harper, Stephen Joseph
Harper, Stephen Joseph
(2006.02.06 - )

Picture of Martin, Paul Edgar Philippe
Martin, Paul Edgar Philippe
(2003.12.12 - 2006.02.05)

Picture of Chrétien, Joseph Jacques Jean
Chrétien, Joseph Jacques Jean
(1993.11.04 - 2003.12.11)

Picture of Campbell, A. Kim
Campbell, A. Kim
(1993.06.25 - 1993.11.03)

Picture of Mulroney, Martin Brian
Mulroney, Martin Brian
(1984.09.17 - 1993.06.24)

Picture of Turner, John Napier
Turner, John Napier
(1984.06.30 - 1984.09.16)

Picture of Clark, Charles Joseph
Clark, Charles Joseph
(1979.06.04 - 1980.03.02)

Picture of Trudeau, Pierre Elliott
Trudeau, Pierre Elliott
(1980.03.03 - 1984.06.29)
(1968.04.20 - 1979.06.03)


Picture of Pearson, Lester Bowles
Pearson, Lester Bowles
(1963.04.22 - 1968.04.19)

Picture of Diefenbaker, John George
Diefenbaker, John George
(1957.06.21 - 1963.04.21)

Picture of St-Laurent, Louis Stephen
St-Laurent, Louis Stephen
(1948.11.15 - 1957.06.20)

Picture of Bennett, Richard Bedford
Bennett, Richard Bedford
(1930.08.07 - 1935.10.22)

Picture of King, William Lyon Mackenzie
King, William Lyon Mackenzie
(1935.10.23 - 1948.11.14)
(1921.12.29 - 1926.06.28)
(1926.09.25 - 1930.08.06)


Picture of Meighen, Arthur
Meighen, Arthur
(1926.06.29 - 1926.09.24)
(1920.07.10 - 1921.12.28)


Picture of Borden, Robert Laird
Borden, Robert Laird
(1911.10.10 - 1917.10.11)
(1917.10.12 - 1920.07.09)


Picture of Laurier, Wilfrid
Laurier, Wilfrid
(1896.07.11 - 1911.10.06)

Picture of Tupper, Charles
Tupper, Charles
(1896.05.01 - 1896.07.08)

Picture of Bowell, Mackenzie
Bowell, Mackenzie
(1894.12.21 - 1896.04.27)

Picture of Thompson, John Sparrow David
Thompson, John Sparrow David
(1892.12.05 - 1894.12.12)

Picture of Abbott, John Joseph Caldwell
Abbott, John Joseph Caldwell
(1891.06.16 - 1892.11.24)

Picture of Mackenzie, Alexander
Mackenzie, Alexander
(1873.11.07 - 1878.10.08)

Picture of Macdonald, John Alexander
Macdonald, John Alexander
(1878.10.17 - 1891.06.06)
(1867.07.01 - 1873.11.05)


Monday, February 23, 2009

who are these People?

Patterson Palmer Hunt Murphy

Po Box 1324 Stn Main
Saint John NB, E2L 4H8

Phone #: 506-633-2712
Fax #: 506-632-8809

Key contact: Franklin O Leger


Sales: $1 - $5 Million

Products and Services Description

Attorneys
Legal Services

Tuesday, February 17, 2009

Fraud by the Government

Concerning property the Government acquired for the Fredericton to Moncton 4 lane highway

It is important to keep in mind that property Expropriated from property owners in FACT

was TURN OVER to a private consortium ( M.R.D.C.) Maritime,Road,Development,Corporation,

and not the public of New Brunswick as would be in most cases?

now who are these people that take the taxpayer money, who was the head of this four lane highway.

now who are the lawyers that took on 75% of the legal work??

P.P.H.M. law and one of the head lawyer here was Hon Douglas Young .

now was this not a Conflict of interest that the Government set in place to Fraud Property owner of there property.

I have loss my total life work and money in my fight with the Government over my property'

and if any of you other that read this blog and want to start a class Action on this matter

give me a hoot. because by my self ? I at the end of the Road,

Monday, February 16, 2009

Posted by Picasa

give the taxpayer money to your bubby?

AECL paying out $100M for Point Lepreau, Bruce refurbishment delays
Last Updated: Friday, February 13, 2009
CBC News
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/new-brunswick/story/2009/02/13/nb-hay-lepreau.html


Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. is paying out $100 million in extra costs for
delays with nuclear refurbishment projects at Point Lepreau, N.B., and the
Bruce plant in Ontario.Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. is paying out $100
million in extra costs for delays with nuclear refurbishment projects at
Point Lepreau, N.B., and the Bruce plant in Ontario.

Delays in the $1.4-billion refurbishment of the Point Lepreau, N.B.,
nuclear power plant are hitting Canadians in the wallet, according to new
documents released by the federal government.

The Treasury Board of Canada reported Thursday that Atomic Energy of Canada
Ltd. is paying $100 million to cover the cost associated with delays at two
nuclear refurbishment projects. The federal Crown corporation is also
running late on the refurbishment of a Candu reactor at the Bruce complex
near Lake Huron in Ontario, and now Ottawa is budgeting extra money in its
latest batch of supplementary estimates.

It's not clear how much of the $100 million is to cover the Point Lepreau
delays and how much is for the Ontario project.

David Hay, the president and chief executive officer of NB Power, has
estimated that a four-month delay at Point Lepreau could cost the utility
upward of $90 million.

AECL is required to pay penalties to NB Power for any delays at Point
Lepreau, which was a key part of the refurbishment agreement in 2005.

Hay said the penalties protect New Brunswickers from higher delay costs.

"My view was I negotiated it on behalf of New Brunswick taxpayers," Hay
told reporters on Friday.

"And do they have some element towards federal responsibility? Of course.
When we hired AECL, everybody knew that. But we're getting a pretty good
share of it."

This is the first Candu-6 reactor refurbishment project, which is expected
to extend the life of Atlantic Canada's only nuclear power plant by 25 to
30 years. AECL is hoping to market these refurbishment projects to other
Candu-6 reactor facilities around the world.

The Point Lepreau project was supposed to be finished at the end of
September, but now it may take until Christmas or later.

Norman Rubin of the Toronto-based environmental group Energy Probe said
it's unacceptable to not know how that money will be divided up when
taxpayers are footing the bill.

"The sad thing here is that you and I and all of your listeners have signed
on ... to cover AECL's penalties and overruns, but we're not allowed to
look at the contract that triggers those penalties and costs for overruns,"
Rubin said.

Rubin said if this happened in a private company, heads would roll.


JATAM (Jaringan Advokasi Tambang/Mining Advocacy Network)
www.jatam.org
www.minesandcommunities.org
www.frederictonpeace.org


Sunday, February 15, 2009

Being Withheld in the Justice System

Staff Reporter

Thousands of pages of documents detailing the federal government's handling of this summer's listeria outbreak are being withheld.

The Star and the CBC are seeking the records, which include emails sent between officials with the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), Maple Leaf Foods and the City of Toronto, through an access to information request.

The CFIA has imposed extensions of a year or more on top of the normal 30-day deadline for responding to such requests.

Citing the sheer volume of documents requested, the department says it is short-staffed and can't produce the information any faster.

look like i have to pay the government to take my property






RICHARD A. HARRIS

APPELLANT


RICHARD A. HARRIS

APPELANT

- and -


- et -

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF THEPROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK, as represented by the MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION

RESPONDENT


SA MAJESTÉ LA REINE DU CHEF DU NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK, représentée par le MINISTRE DES TRANSPORTS

INTIMÉE

Harris v. The Queen as Represented by the Minister of Transportation, 2008 NBCA 82


Harris c. La Reine, représentée par le ministre des Transports, 2008 NBCA 82

CORAM:

The Honourable Justice Larlee

The Honourable Justice Richard

The Honourable Justice Quigg


CORAM :

L’honorable juge Larlee

L’honorable juge Richard

L’honorable juge Quigg

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen's Bench:

June 3, 2005


Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine :

Le 3 juin 2005


Look at what i was paid for this property in back of two legal size building lots


Judge David Russell Quotes 2005 [56] Mr. Carter correctly utilized the Direct Comparison Approach and correctly analyzed available market data. Approximately 86.5% of the parent lot remains for future development with substantial access to the Broad Road. I conclude the value placed on the expropriated portion of the parent lot by Mr. Carter is appropriate as is his finding there was no injurious affection. The value of the H.A.R. lands taken is, therefore, $2726.00.


? mr Carter also did a report that said this same property H.A.R. Lands was $ 36,000.00 ? why did not Douglas Caldwell or

Representation of Parties at Trial:

Douglas A. Caldwell, Q.C. ) for the Applicants.

Robert H. Pineo, Esq. )

)

David Eidt, Esq. ) for the Respondent. John S Raymond

for the tax payer payer ? take look at my lawyers bill to the Government government

$ 212,000.00


so why did not the lawyers not ask for this edvient to be put forth in Court in March of 2005 when they be came a ware of this report ? for $36,000.00 ? so why did these apple Judges

not give me relief in this hearing of the above ?? i would guest ? that Caldwell & pineo would not had a chance to get any of the Taxpayer money ? and my Action on the Goodwin matter would of been in my favors ? so what left for me now ??????

CORAM:

The Honourable Justice Larlee

The Honourable Justice Richard

The Honourable Justice Quigg





History of Case:


Historique de la cause :

Decision under appeal:

2005 NBQB 197 (CanLII), 2005 NBQB 197


Décision frappée d’appel :

2005 NBBR 197

Preliminary or incidental proceedings:

N/A


Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires :

s.o.

Appeal heard:

October 15, 2008


Appel entendu :

Le 15 octobre 2008

Judgment rendered:

November 20, 2008


Jugement rendu :

Le 20 novembre 2008

Reasons for judgment by:

The Honourable Justice Larlee


Motifs de jugement :

L’honorable juge Larlee

Concurred in by:

The Honourable Justice Richard

The Honourable Justice Quigg


Souscrivent aux motifs :

L’honorable juge Richard

L’honorable juge Quigg

Counsel at hearing:

For the appellant:

David H. Dunsmuir

For the respondent:

David D. Eidt


Avocats à l’audience :

Pour l’appelant :

David H. Dunsmuir

Pour l’intimée :

David D. Eidt

THE COURT

The appeal is dismissed with costs of $3,500.


LA COUR

Rejette l’appel avec dépens de 3 500 $.


The judgment of the Court was delivered by

LARLEE, J.A.

[1] The appellant, Richard Harris, appeals one aspect of a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench, which fixed compensation pursuant to theExpropriation Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. E-14, for a partial taking of land for a highway widening project. The decision is reported at2005 NBQB 197 (CanLII), (2005), 283 N.B.R. (2d) 184, [2005] N.B.J. No. 220 (QL), 2005 NBQB 197.

[2] The respondent argues that Mr. Harris cannot maintain an appeal because the land that is the subject of this appeal was owned at the time of the expropriation by H.A.R. Construction Limited, Mr. Harris’ corporation. Section 1 of the Act defines owner as including “… any person holding an estate, easement, license or other right or interest in, to, over or affecting land.” The duty of a statutory authority to compensate is found at Part II, s. 25 of theAct:

Where land is expropriated or injuriously affected, or where property other than land is taken, interfered with or injured under authority of a statute that requires compensation to be paid, the statutory authority shall pay each owner compensation determined in accordance with this Part.

[Emphasis added.]

[3] Section 31(1) of the Act provides that where a statutory authority and an owner have not agreed upon compensation payable under the Act in respect of the expropriation or injurious affection authorized by the Act, either the statutory authority or the owner may apply to the Court of Queen’s Bench to settle any dispute between them by serving upon the other of them and the Court a notice of arbitration.

[4] Section 31(3) of the Act provides that a notice of arbitration shall state the name of the owner. The notice of arbitration named both H.A.R. Construction Limited and Richard Harris as owners. The Act does not differentiate between corporations and natural persons as owners. The style of cause in the application named H.A.R. Construction Limited, Richard Harris, and Richard James Joseph Harris as applicants. H.A.R. Construction Limited is not a party to this appeal, yet the land in question in this appeal, Lot 97-3 (part of PID #60047644, DOT Plans 12-2-0036 and 12-2-0037), is land in which H.A.R. Construction Limited held “… an estate, easement, licence or other right or interest in, to, over or affecting land” within the meaning of owner under the Act. There was no evidence before the Court, on the hearing of the arbitration, that Mr. Harris had any such interest in the land in question. The evidence is that after the expropriation, the land was transferred by deed on December 13, 1999, from H.A.R. Construction Limited to Mr. Harris’ son, Richard James Joseph Harris. For all intents and purposes the company is no longer in existence. I agree with the respondent that Mr. Harris has no capacity to appeal the decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench in place of H.A.R. Construction Limited. Therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and I would dismiss it.

[5] That said I would have dismissed the appeal, in any event, on the merits. I am of the view that the application judge did not make a palpable and overriding error in coming to his decision. Briefly, here are the reasons.

[6] In 1993, Mr. Harris and H.A.R. Construction Limited acquired a 12.66-hectare parcel of land for $25,000. In December of 1996, the Department of Transportation advised Mr. Harris by letter that it intended to survey the lands for possible use in the construction of the new Trans-Canada Highway. In January of 1997, Mr. Harris filed a plan to further subdivide the land, but the Rural Planning District Commission refused approval of the plan. In September of 1997, the Province sent a Notice of Intention to Expropriate, and repeatedly revised the amount offered for the parcels to be taken, based on appraisal reports and reflecting “the development potential of the property.” On June 20, 2000, Mr. Harris filed a Notice of Arbitration, claiming $909,614.65 for loss of investment, loss of future income, and remediation costs.

[7] A number of parcels of land were involved in this expropriation. The application judge quantified each parcel of land, and awarded, for the land itself and as reimbursement for site preparation work, site clean-up work, and costs of a culvert, $52,846.65 plus interest, less the $20,726.00 the respondent had already paid. With respect to the parcel of land that is the subject of this appeal, Lot 97-3, the application judge rejected Mr. Harris’ claim for business loss, and held that the subdivision plan had been “prepared to bolster his claim for compensation in face of the impending expropriation.” He found that the value of the land taken was $2,726.

[8] In his decision, the application judge identified and applied the principles that govern an assessment of this type. Specifically, he used the comparative sales or market data approach to valuation instead of the land development subdivision approach. In rejecting the latter method he relied on Eric Todd, The Law of Expropriation and Compensation in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1992) at 218-19; R.P.B. Construction Ltée. v. Nouveau-Brunswick (Ministre des Transports)  (reflex-logo) reflex, (1995), 168 N.B.R. (2d) 365 (Q.B.), [1995] N.B.J. No. 519 (QL) and Sutherland v.Langley (Township) (1997), 39 M.P.L.R. (2d) 277 (B.C.S.C.), [1997] B.C.J. No. 1716 (QL). See also Maguire v. Province of New Brunswick(1976), 13 N.B.R. (2d) 624, rev’d on other grounds (1976), 16 N.B.R. (2d) 189 (C.A.), [1976] N.B.J. No. 249 (QL).

[9] The application judge assessed the evidence, accepted the evidence of certain experts, and made findings of fact that are supported by that evidence. I am unable to discern any error that would justify appellate intervention, and in fact, am in substantial agreement with the reasons given by the application judge.


[10] For the reasons set out in paragraphs 1-4, I would dismiss the appeal and order costs of $3,500 can you be leave this could be going on in Canada >/.... ??? send your story to me.

c



Wednesday, February 11, 2009

legal fraud

Young v. City of Moncton, 2002 NBCA 26 94/99/CA






IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF NEW BRUNSWICK


Turnbull, Drapeau and Robertson, JJ.A.







B E T W E E N:



RONALD R. YOUNG ) Douglas Caldwell, Q.C.

) and Bruno Roy, Esq.

(Applicant) APPELANT ) for the Appellant

)

- and - )

)

THE CITY OF MONCTON ) Stephen M. Trueman, Esq.

) and Anne F. Beaulieu, Esqe.

(Respondent) RESPONDENT ) for the Respondent







APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF: Godin, J.

March 12, 1999





DATE OF HEARING: March 12, 2002



DATE OF DECISION: March 21, 2002



REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY: Drapeau, J.A.



CONCURRED IN BY: Turnbull, J.A.

and Robertson, J.A.







THE COURT




The appeal is dismissed and the appellant is ordered to pay the respondent costs in the amount of $1,500.





DRAPEAU, J.A.



[1] On November 29, 1995, the City of Moncton expropriated the appellant’s property, a 20,952 square foot lot and former school building located on the outskirts of the municipality. The parties failed to reach an agreement on the compensation payable under the Expropriation Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. E-14 and, as a result, the appellant invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of Queen’s Bench under the Act to settle the matter. Following a four-day trial, Justice Godin accepted the opinion of Daniel Doucet, the real estate appraiser who testified on behalf of the City, and determined that the market value of the appellant’s property was no more than $52,500, the amount offered by the City at the time of expropriation in full satisfaction of its obligations under the Act.



[2] The substantive challenge to the decision under appeal, now reported at reflex, (1999), 211 N.B.R. (2d) 26, is that it sets the subject property’s market value without regard to its highest and best use at the time of the expropriation, which was, according to the appellant, the conversion of the existing school building into a 12-unit apartment.





The Context


[3] The trial judge provides the following useful description of the subject property’s salient characteristics at paragraph 3 of his reasons for judgment:





The subject property was located on the Shediac Road and consisted of an irregular shaped lot with 117.2 feet of frontage on Shediac Road and 177.2 feet on Wortman Road. After being expropriated, the subject property was developed into a street linking the TransCanada Highway, at its Caledonia Industrial Park exit, to the Dieppe Industrial Park. The total area of the property is 20,952 square feet. There was a four room school building on the property which had been built in 1947 to serve the Harrisville subdivision. The school was closed in or around the year 1984. The main building was 76 feet by 46 feet. With the addition of 3 porches, it covered an area of 3,672 square feet. The building had a main floor where the classrooms were located as well as a finished basement which housed the washrooms, the furnace room, a staff room and an auditorium.







[4] In 1987, the Province of New Brunswick sold the school property for one dollar to the New Brunswick German Association so that it might turn the site into a cultural center. When the Association failed to secure the requisite financing for its project, the subject property was put up for sale on the open market and acquired, in March of 1989, by the appellant for the sum of $40,000. Later in that year, the appellant obtained a conditional re-zoning for the property from Parks and Institutional to Highway Commercial for the purpose of converting the school building into apartments and a computer showroom in the basement.



[5] The re-zoning was conditional on the property being developed for the requested purpose otherwise the zoning would revert to Parks and Institutional. The appellant drew plans for the redevelopment of the school building, but was precluded from obtaining a building permit for his project when modifications to the Municipal Plan earmarked his property for use in the construction of a street linking the Caledonia Estates Industrial Park to the Dieppe Industrial Park.



[6] At trial, the appellant claimed the sum of $255,000 as compensation under the Act. W.H. Goodwin Jr., who was qualified as an expert in the field of real estate appraisal, testified in support of the appellant’s claim. In Mr. Goodwin’s opinion, the highest and best use of the subject property at the time of expropriation involved the conversion of the four-room school building, which he found to be structurally sound and to have significant commercial value, into a 12-unit “motel plan” apartment building. Mr. Goodwin explained that there are no central hallways in a motel style apartment, each tenant having direct access from his unit to the outside, and that, by sparing the owner the cost of heating and lighting the hallways as well as the cost of their maintenance, a motel style apartment is significantly less expensive to operate than other, more conventional, types of apartment buildings.



[7] Mr. Goodwin concluded that, on the basis of its use as a motel type apartment, the subject property’s market value was in the order of $255,000. He arrived at that amount by reconciling the results obtained from his application of the three commonly employed approaches to the determination of real property market value: the market data or direct comparison approach, the income capitalization approach and the replacement cost approach.



[8] Daniel Doucet, who was also qualified as an expert in the field of real estate appraisal, testified that the replacement cost approach could not yield an accurate market value estimate because it did not reflect the impact of the subject property’s poor location. Mr. Doucet testified that a number of factors, including the high cost of converting the former school building into an apartment building and the subject property’s poor location, conjoined to undermine the financial feasibility of any plan to use the subject property as a site for an apartment building. The thrust of Mr. Doucet’s testimony was that neither Mr. Goodwin’s suggested use for the subject property, a motel style apartment, nor the appellant’s pre-expropriation project, apartments combined with a computer showroom in the basement, qualified as a “highest and best” use for valuation purposes.



[9] Aris Vautour’s testimony buttressed Mr. Doucet’s opinion on the key issue of the subject property’s unsuitability for development as an apartment project. Mr. Vautour, an experienced apartment building developer and owner, testified that location is the prime consideration in site selection for the construction of any financially viable apartment project. The explanation is simple: poor location hinders, to a significant extent, the landlord in his or her efforts to rent units and to obtain suitable rent. Mr. Vautour asserted that he would not build to own an apartment building on the subject property because of its distance from key services.



[10] Mr. Doucet added that, in his opinion, the cost of renovating the former school building was prohibitive no matter what use was proposed for it and that, as a result, the building in question was without any commercial value. In Mr. Doucet’s view, the highest and best use of the subject property was as bare land for the construction of a financially feasible residential or commercial project. Using the direct comparison approach, Mr. Doucet concluded that the bare land had a market value of $2.50 per square foot or $52,380 for the whole property.



[11] The appellant contends that the trial judge erred in law by failing to determine his property’s market value on the basis that its highest and best use was the conversion of the former school building into a 12-unit motel style apartment, by finding that the building in place was without commercial value and by relying upon Mr. Doucet’s direct comparison approach to the valuation of the bare land, an approach which, according to the appellant, failed to comply with the standards that govern professional appraisals, the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal and Practice. The appellant contends, as well, that the trial judge erred in law in not ordering Mr. Doucet to produce for inspection appraisal reports considered by him in the preparation of his report on the subject property’s market value.



[12] Finally, the appellant submits that the trial judge erred in law in considering that he was not free to reach his own conclusion as to the market value of the subject property and that he was bound to accept in toto the opinion of either one or the other of the experts who testified on the issue at trial. In support of that submission, the appellant filed a motion under Rule 62.21(2) of the Rules of Court requesting that this Court receive evidence by way of an affidavit from his counsel at trial, Ted Ehrhardt. In his written submission, the appellant summarizes the contents of Mr. Ehrhardt’s affidavit as follows:



Just prior to the commencement of the trial, the Appellant’s solicitor at the time, Mr. Edwin G. Ehrhardt and the solicitor for the City of Moncton, Mr. Stephen M. Trueman, attended an “in chambers” meeting with the trial judge. During this meeting, the trial judge, Mr. Justice Paul Godin, indicated to the solicitors that he was faced with two conflicting appraisal reports. The trial judge reminded the solicitors of one of his recent decisions wherein he had concluded that the Court should rely on one of the appraisal reports to the exclusion of the other in its entirety. Mr. Justice Godin gave the solicitors a strong indication that he may well be in the same position in this case. ...





Analysis and Decision



I. Preliminary Issues



Did the trial judge misapprehend, as the appellant contends, the scope of his adjudicative duties on the issue of the subject property’s market value?





[13] It is axiomatic that the trial judge was not bound to adopt the views of either of the two appraisers who testified at trial on the issue of the subject property’s market value. See A.R.N. Cross & C. Tapper, Cross and Tapper on Evidence, 8th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1995) at 556-57. Of course, had Justice Godin determined the market value under the mistaken belief that he was bound to accept in toto either Mr. Goodwin’s or Mr. Doucet’s opinion, he clearly would have been in error as to the scope of his adjudicative mandate under the Act.

[14] In my view, this Court can safely presume that Justice Godin, an experienced trial judge, knew that he was not under any legal compulsion to adopt, without any of the adjustments required by the evidence, one or the other of the expert opinions submitted by the parties for his consideration. I am comforted in that view by the fact that Justice Godin indicates in his reasons for judgment that he came to the conclusion that the former school building was without commercial value on the basis of the “preponderance of [the] evidence”. That brings me to the appellant’s motion to adduce further evidence.



[15] The affidavit evidence proffered by the appellant does not support the conclusion that the trial judge was operating under some misconception as to the scope of his adjudicative mandate under the Act. All that the trial judge is alleged to have stated in chambers is that he might find himself in the position of having to choose the opinion of one expert over that of the other. It is neither improper nor uncommon for a trial judge to be moved by the evidence to choose one of several conflicting expert opinions. I fail to see how the trial judge’s alleged statement evinces a misconceived atrophy of the scope of his adjudicative mandate. That being so, the admission of the evidence proffered by the appellant would serve no useful purpose. Accordingly, I would dismiss the appellant’s motion under Rule 62.21(2). I should add that the appellant did not argue that Justice Godin made the statement attributed to him in the context of a pre-trial conference pursuant to Rule 50. If that argument had been advanced, this Court would have had to consider whether Justice Godin had disqualified himself from presiding at the trial. See Rules 50.03 and 50.06.





Did the trial judge improperly refuse to order production of relevant documents?





[16] Mr. Doucet testified that he relied, in part, upon information contained in appraisal reports prepared in relation to apartment buildings owned by Aris Vautour to reach his conclusion on the issue of the subject property’s market value. The appellant immediately moved for production of those appraisal reports under Rule 52.01(4). In his written submission, the appellant contends that the trial judge improperly denied his motion for production. I disagree.



[17] After questioning whether the rule invoked by the appellant, Rule 52.01(4), had any application once the trial had begun, Justice Godin asked Mr. Doucet to produce the reports requested by the appellant. The record shows that Mr. Doucet complied with the trial judge’s request, prior to the conclusion of his cross-examination by counsel for the appellant.





Did Mr. Doucet fail to comply with the applicable standards in appraising the appellant’s land?





[18] The standards that governed professional appraisals at the time that Mr. Doucet employed the direct comparison approach to ascertain the market value of the subject property specified that any comparison undertaken involve properties similar to the subject property and that appropriate adjustments be made to account for any material differences. The appellant points out that none of the lots used by Mr. Doucet for comparative purposes were suitable for the construction of an apartment building. The appellant submits that, as a result, Mr. Doucet’s direct comparison approach strayed from the standards mentioned above and ought to have been discarded by the trial judge. I disagree.



[19] Once Mr. Doucet concluded that the subject property was not suitable, at least financially, for development as an apartment site, it followed that properties suitable for such purposes were not useful points of reference for valuation purposes. Mr. Doucet compared the subject property to lots suitable for residential (single-family dwelling) and commercial (e.g. office building and car wash) purposes. I am satisfied that Mr. Doucet’s direct comparison approach was in sync with the subject property’s highest and best use.



[20] In my view, Mr. Doucet’s direct comparison approach to the valuation of the bare land complied with the governing standards for professional appraisals. I now turn to the appellant’s substantive challenge to the market value determination made in the court below.











II. The Merits



[21] The review that the appellant asks this Court to undertake is one that must be conducted within a framework which, in the absence of some material error by the trial judge, calls for a high degree of deference for his findings of fact and his conclusion, one that was largely fact-driven, on the issue of the subject property’s market value. The several justifications for appellate deference toward the trial judge’s conclusions of fact are adumbrated in St-Jean v. Mercier, 2002 SCC 15 (CanLII), 2002 SCC 15; [2002] S.C.J. No. 17, online: QL (SCJ). Appellate deference for those conclusions is appropriate not only because of the special advantages that come with presiding over the trial but, as well, because, as Gonthier J. explains in St-Jean v. Mercier, at para. 42, “the autonomy and integrity of the trial process as well as resource allocation militate in favour of the finality of judgments”. Few would argue with the proposition that the finality of judgments serves the best interests of justice. See Friolet v. Friolet reflex, (1998), 201 N.B.R. (2d) 118, at paras. 22-23 (C.A.).



[22] While it is true that the principle of non-interference in a trial judge’s findings of fact does not apply with equal force to inferences drawn from conflicting expert testimony where, as here, credibility is not an issue, the setting aside of any such inference cannot be justified unless it was not reasonably open to the trial judge to extract it from the evidence. See Toneguzzo-Norvell (Guardian ad litem of) v. Burnaby Hospital, 1994 CanLII 106 (S.C.C.), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 114, at pages 121-22.



[23] Section 38(1) of the Act provides that the compensation payable upon expropriation shall be based, in part, upon the market value of the land. “Market value” is defined in s. 39(1) as “the amount that would have been paid for the land if it had been sold on the date of expropriation in the open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer”. The Act implicitly requires that “market value” be determined on the basis of the present potential of the expropriated property’s highest and best use. See E.C.E. Todd, The Law of Expropriation and Compensation in Canada, 2nd ed. (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1992) at 133. That use, which may be other than the property’s use at the time of expropriation, is the cornerstone for whatever compensation is payable under the Act and under most, if not all, other Canadian expropriation statutes. See Saint John Priory of Canada Properties v. Saint John (City), 1972 CanLII 133 (S.C.C.), [1972] S.C.R. 746 and Re Valley Improvement Co. Ltd. v. Metropolitan Toronto & Region Conservation Authority (1965), 51 D.L.R. (2d) 481 at p. 491, (Ont.C.A.), per Roach J.A.



[24] That said, it must be remembered that the concept of “highest and best use” refers to “the highest economic use to which a buyer and seller, each willing and knowledgeable, would reasonably anticipate the lands would probably be put” [Emphasis added]. See J.A. Coates and S.F. Waqué, New Law of Expropriation, looseleaf, vol. 1 (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell, 1986), at 10-84. The highest and best use advocated by the owner of expropriated land should be rejected as the basis for the determination of its market value under the Act when that use is not economically feasible. See Guido (Estate of) et al. v. Ministry of Transportation and Communications (1977), 13 L.C.R. 97, at p. 98 (Ont.H.C.J.). What constitutes the highest and best use for a particular expropriated property is a question of fact.



[25] After referring to the statutory definition of “market value” and thoroughly reviewing the evidence offered by each expert appraiser, Justice Godin made the following observations concerning Mr. Goodwin’s approaches to the determination of market value in the case at hand:



Central to Mr. Goodwin’s approach is the theory that “motel” style apartments are premium apartments which brings in a higher rental for its owner than the more conventional apartments and cannot be compared to ordinary apartments. Thus, in arriving at his value, Mr. Goodwin has referred to “true motel” style apartments which is a reference to that type of apartments that have been built in and around Moncton in the last few years. There are two immediate problems with this approach. First, the applicant’s project is substantially different than the “true motel” style apartments that were used for comparison, and, secondly, the fact that there has been no sale of “motel” style apartments does not, in my view, justify Mr. Goodwin's refusal to consider the actual market for apartments generally.



The applicant’s project differs from the typical “motel” type apartment in that the applicant’s plan called for four apartments below grade and eight apartments that are on two levels where the bedroom is one floor above the kitchen and living room area. The typical “motel” type apartment is in the area of 1008 sq. feet whereas the applicant’s plan calls for apartments having an area of only 828 square feet or 13 to 18% less area than the typical “motel” style apartment that Mr. Goodwin uses as reference to arrive at the market value of the project. The typical “motel” style apartment also includes a dishwasher but none are included in the applicant’s project.



... [T]he cost method, does not satisfactorily dispose of the issue of the poor location of the subject property for development of an apartment building. The “motel” style apartments referred to by Mr. Goodwin in his appraisal all have better locations than the subject property. Mr. Vautour testified that he would not build an apartment building in an area such as that of the subject property which is 3 or 4 kilometres from services.



In my estimation, the differences between the intended project and traditional type of apartments are no greater than the differences between a true “motel” type apartment and the intended development of the subject property. By not considering actual sales in making his direct comparison approach, Mr. Goodwin was free to develop figures which were highly favourable to the applicant but not necessarily reflective [of] the market. ...







[26] The trial judge found that the subject property’s distance (3-4 kilometers) from services, such as grocery stores, made it a poor location for the development of a profitable apartment project. It is implicit from his reasons for judgment that the trial judge was satisfied that the uses advocated by or on behalf of the appellant were not economically feasible. That being so, the trial judge was unquestionably right in rejecting Mr. Goodwin’s opinion that the subject property’s highest and best use was the conversion of the school building into a 12-unit motel style apartment.



[27] Moreover, it was reasonably open to the trial judge to accept Mr. Doucet’s opinion that the subject property’s highest and best use involved the removal of the former school building and the development of the bare land for commercial and residential purposes, the latter being limited to the subject property’s use as a site for a single family dwelling as opposed to an apartment building. I am also satisfied that it was reasonably open to the trial judge to accept Mr. Doucet’s opinion that the market value of the bare land was in the order of $52,500.





Conclusion and Disposition



[28] The trial judge’s reasons for judgment reveal that he accurately instructed himself on the principles of law that govern the determination of market value under the Expropriation Act and that he correctly applied those principles to the facts as he found them. Having regard to the limited scope of appellate intervention allowed by the applicable standard of review, I am not persuaded that this Court ought to disturb the trial judge’s finding that the market value of the appellant’s property was $52,500 at the time of expropriation. I would dismiss the appeal with costs of $1,500.





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J. ERNEST DRAPEAU, J.A.



WE CONCUR









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WALLACE S. TURNBULL, J.A.







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JOSEPH T. ROBERTSON, J.A.